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INSURANCE-VARIABLE .ANNUITIES-APPLICATION OF INVESTMENT COM-
PANY ACT OF 1940-Anticipating the sale of variable annuity contracts as 
a part of its regular business, Prudential, a life insurance company, applied 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission for complete exemption from 
the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940.1 Prudential 
claimed that it qualified for exemption as an insurance company2 under 
the definition of "insurance company" in the Investment Company Act 
("a company ... whose primary and predominant business activity is the 
·writing of insurance . . . and which is subject to supervision by the in-
surance commissioner or a similar official or agency of a state").8 In the 
alternative, Prudential requested exemption from specific provisions of the 
Investment Company Act4 relating primarily to investor control and re-
deemability requirements. On the principal application, asking complete 
1 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1958). 
2 Section ll(c)(ll) of the Investment Company Act specifically exempts from the 
coverage of the act's provisions any "insurance company" as defined in § 2(a)(l7). 54 
Stat. 798, 79!3 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-ll(c)(ll), •2(a)(l 7) (1958). 
3 54 Stat. 79!3 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(l7) (1958). 
4 Section 6(c) provides that the SEC may grant exemptions, conditionally or un-
conditionally, from the provisions of the act "if and to the extent that such exemption 
is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of 
investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions" of the act. 54 
Stat. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1958). See Great American Life Underwriters, Inc., 
Investment Co. Act Release No. !3070, July 15, 1960. 
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exemption, held, denied. If an insurance company sells equity interests to 
the public and creates an investment fund, the insurance company's exemp-
tion from federal regulation does not carry over to the investment fund, 
which is treated as a separate entity. Moreover, the Supreme Court decision 
which initially brought the variable annuity under federal securities regula-
tion as a "security" classified the annuity contract itself,5 apart from any 
consideration of the type of company issuing it.6 Prudential Ins. Co. of 
America, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 3620, Jan. 22, 1963. 
The variable annuity was developed a decade ago in response to the 
need for a retirement plan which would guarantee payments until death, 
as did an ordinary annuity, yet provide for appreciation of the principal 
to counter inflation, as would a share of common stock. 7 The logical solu-
tion was to combine the insurance function of distributing mortality risk 
over a large number of persons with the security's ability to appreciate 
IS See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); cf. the definition of 
an investment contract set forth in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). 
6 In response to Prudential's alternative applications for exemption from specific 
Investment Company Act provisions, the Commission made the following orders: 
(a) Exemption from § 16(a), which requires election of directors by holders of the 
securities, was denied. Variable annuity holders, having funds at risk, must have power 
to determine management policies affecting the investment fund. The requirement of 
investor control was a prime concern of the Investment Company Act. See Hearings on 
S. 3580 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess. 253 (1940) (hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
(b) Exemption from §§ 22(e) and 27(c)(l), which require that all investment company 
securities be redeemable within seven days of presentation by the holder, was denied 
as to the "pay-in" period (the time in which the annuitant is accumulating "units" in 
the fund) and granted as to the "pay-out," or annuity, period. The redemption require-
ment in no way impairs or alters the variable annuity program during the accumulation 
period since the issuer then operates exactly like an ordinary investment company; 
however, the "pay-out" period involves a schedule of mortality assumptions by the insurer 
which would be useless if unilateral withdrawal of unliquidated units were permitted. 
See Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, Investment Company Act Release No. 
2974, Feb. 25, 1960, pp. 20-21. Haussermann, The Security in Variable Annuities, 1956 
INS. L.J. 382, 384. 
(c) Exemption was also sought from § 22(d), which prohibits sale of securities at other 
than the public offering price, the insurer's plan being to charge a defaulting variable 
annuity holder who later cures the default with the higher of current offering price 
and the price at the time of default. In denying this exemption, the Commission 
reasoned that under Prudential's plan the penalty could well exceed (in a declining 
market) the 9% maximum prescribed in § 27(a)(l), or be "unconscionable or grossly 
excessive" in violation of § 22(b). Viewed as an administrative charge, it could exceed 
the "reasonable amount" standard of § 27(a)(5). 
(d) Exemption from the semi-annual report requirement of § 30(d) was also denied. 
The disclosure requirement is essential for intelligent exercise by the variable annuity 
holder of his right to elect directors and to sell or redeem his securities. See Hearings 
302-03, 329. See also Haussermann, supra at 390. 
(e) Exemptions were granted from § 17(f), regarding banking procedures, and § 
27(a)(3), which prohibits disproportionate deduction of sales expenses from monthly 
payments. It was reasoned that the insurance company had adequate facilities for 
safekeeping of securities, and, regarding sales load deductions, that the commission sales 
arrangements used in the insurance industry (whereby the commission is deducted from 
initial payments) rendered uniform deductions impractical. 
7 The variable annuity began as an employee pension or profit-sharing plan. See 
Haussermann, supra note 6, at 390. 
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in value along with general price rises.8 Such a combination is the variable 
annuity. During a specified number of years the annuitant's premiums are 
placed in an investment fund which consists of a widely diversified pool 
of common stocks. His interest is computed in terms of "units," each "unit" 
being a proportion of the fund; the value of each "unit" fluctuates with 
the rise and fall of the stock values in the fund. After the premiums are 
fully paid and the "pay-out" period begins, the insurer must liquidate 
units of the fund periodically in order to make payments to the annuitant. 
The payments are measured by the value of a fixed number of units; 
however, the value of a unit in the "pay-out" period also depends upon 
the investment experience of the fund. The actuarial function of the in-
surance company becomes significant in the "pay-out" period, for, unlike 
shares in a mutual fund, the variable annuity guarantees "unit" payments 
for the life of the holder, whether he reaches or exceeds his statistical 
life expectancy.9 However, unlike the ordinary annuity policy, the variable 
annuity guarantees no fixed sum payment. Underlying the variable annuity 
plan is the assumption that a diversified pool of common stock will ap-
preciate at the same rate as general price levels; however, in practice the 
variable annuity holder is assuming not only the risk that a recession will 
drive the value of the annuity below its price,10 but also the risk that 
through mismanagement the fund will not respond to general price in-
creases.11 These are not ordinary insurance risks; they are identical, how-
ever, to the risks facing purchasers of shares in an investment company. 
Consequently, the variable annuity is both a security and an annuity; both 
the mortality risk of insurance and the investment risk of securities are 
quite significant. 
The dual nature of the variable annuity has created substantial prob-
lems as to the proper scope of federal securities regulation and state insur-
ance regulation. In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,12 the Supreme 
s See Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1956 INs. 
L.J. 357, 359. In addition to the assumption that common stock values reflect general 
price level fluctuations, the variable annuity theory assumes that the speculative features 
of equity investment are removed by (1) investing in a widely diversified group of 
equities, and (2) investing in equities over a long period of time. Id. at 359-60. 
9 For an excellent comparison of the variable annuity, standard annuity and mutual 
fund share which points up the importance of the mortality risk which the insurer 
assumes, i.e., guarantees the annuitant he will not outlive his income, see Mearns, The 
Commission, the Variable Annuity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45 VA. L. REv. 831, 
834-38 (1959). 
10 The adverse fluctuation of variable annuity "units" in a recession is defended as 
follows: "[I)s not the annuitant better off if he loses one half of his principal and main-
tains his purchasing power than he is if he maintains his principal and loses one half 
of the purchasing power?" Johnson, supra note 8, at 360. 
11 See Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n, 144 Conn. 346, 131 A.2d 834 (1957), where 
the court held that the variable annuity was not insurance, and pointed out that the 
annuitant assumed the risk of "poor judgment or lack of skill in the management of 
the investments," i.e., the danger that the "unit" "may be depreciated by reason of 
factors not traceable to general economic conditions." Id. at 357-58, 131 A.2d at 840. 
12 359 U.S. 65 (1959) [hereinafter cited as VALIC). 
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Court held that the investment risks of the variable annuity were of 
primary significance, and therefore it is a security subject to the Securities 
Act of 19331s and Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. is an investment 
company subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940. The majority 
in VALIC used what can best be described as a "conceptual" approach: 
the premise being that the variable annuity was either a security or an 
annuity, and the conclusion being that it was basically a security.14 On 
the other hand, the dissenters adopted an "institutional" approach, ar-
guing that the variable annuity was a new concept in insurance, and there-
fore traditional principles of "state regulation and federal abstention," 
as embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,16 required that the states 
be given an opportunity to modify their insurance regulation to provide 
adequate protection for the public, rather than relying upon federal 
regulation.16 Mr. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, recognized 
the dual nature of the variable annuity, but concluded that the more 
significant problems it presented were those which federal securities reg-
ulation, rather than state insurance laws, were designed to solve.17 Wide-
spread criticism of the Court's analysis lends strength to a third possible 
approach-that the variable annuity is both insurance and a security, and 
therefore the Investment Company Act's coverage of investment company 
activities clearly contradicts its express exemption of insurance activities 
under section 3(c)(3) when applied to the variable annuity. Moreover, in 
the setting of variable annuities, the policy of federal intervention in the 
regulation of securities and investment companies seems to conflict with 
the policy directive of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that "no act of Congress 
will be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by 
any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless 
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."18 This third 
1s 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958). 
H Mr. Justice Douglas (who served as Chairman of the SEC, 1934-1936) emphasized 
in the majority opinion: "There is no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of 
insurance as it has commonly been conceived of in popular understanding and usage." 
359 U.S. at 73. 
15 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ IOII-12 (1958). 
16 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated that "the Court is agreed that we should 
not 'freeze' the concept of insurance as it then existed [1933-1940]. By the same token 
we should not proceed on the assumption that the thrust of state regulation is frozen. 
As the insurance business develops new concepts the States adjust and develop their 
controls." 359 U.S. at 101. 
17 "Accordingly, while these contracts contain insurance features, they contain to a 
very substantial degree elements of investment contracts as administered by equity 
investment trusts. They contain these elements in a way different in kind from the way 
that insurance and annuity policies did when Congress wrote the exemptions for them 
in the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act. Since Congress was intending a broad coverage in both 
these remedial Acts and since these contracts present regulatory problems of the very 
sort that Congress was attempting to solve by them, I conclude that Congress did not 
intend to exclude contracts like these by reason of the 'insurance' exemptions." 359 
U.S. at 91. 
18 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1958). Both the Securities Act and the 
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approach suggests that the Court should have made its decision, not on 
the basis of which category the variable annuity most resembled, but, 
rather, which form of regulation most suited this type of annuity-security 
scheme. Whether such an approach would have produced a different hold-
ing is questionable. Nevertheless, as the law exists today a variable annuity 
is a security, and a company primarily engaged in issuing variable annuities 
will be regulated as an investment company. 
The primary importance of the principal case is that it raises the 
question of whether the V ALIC rule was meant to apply to a company such 
as Prudential whose dominant business is the issuance of insurance.10 
V ALIC involved a company engaged primarily in the sale of variable an-
nuities; it was not an "insurance company" within the Investment Com-
pany Act definition20 and thus could not invoke the section 3(c)(3) ex-
emption from federal regulation, once the Court had decided that a 
variable annuity is a security. The question of whether this is• a valid 
distinction for regulatory purposes is not answered by a simple conceptual 
analysis such as was employed in V ALIC. Rather, it requires an analysis 
which the critics said V ALIC avoided-an evaluation of state and con-
current state-federal regulation, both of which are applicable on technical 
grounds, and both of which, arguably, are applicable on policy grounds.21 
The SEC declared in the principal case that the adequacy of state regula-
tion was irrelevant, and that the only consideration was the relationship 
between the variable annuity holder and the issuing company-a relation-
Investment Company Act were enacted before there was any thought of variable annuities, 
indeed, before Congress even realized its power to regulate insurance. See H.R. REP. 
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933). In 1944 the Supreme Court reversed the settled 
view that the insurance business did not involve interstate commerce. United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), overruling Paul v. Virginia, 75 
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Congress then passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act to assure the 
states that it did not intend to exercise this newly discovered power. Since the dual 
nature of the variable annuity brings it within the scope of both securities legislation 
and the insurance company exemption of § 3(c)(3), the question as to which one applies 
cannot be answered by reference to the laws themselves. Professor Mearns has stated that 
"the VALIC case should have been treated as a problem created by the acts of an in-
considerate sovereign. One of his commands could be obeyed, but not both. Pick one, 
deny the other, and your reasons for doing so must ultimately rest on values indicating 
that the particular command selected was the one which ought to be obeyed. Yet no 
one of the opinions makes it clear what values were relied upon." Mearns, supra note 
9, at 845. See also 56 MICH. L. REv. 656 (1958). 
19 See VALIC, 359 U.S. 65, 74 n.3 (1959). The Investment Company Act defines "invest-
ment company" in§ 3(a)(l) as any issuer which "is or holds itself out as being engaged primar-
ily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
securities." 54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l) (1958). This definition would apply 
to Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., but could not cover Prudential. It is arguable, then, 
that the Court did not contemplate extension of its holding to a company squarely under 
the "insurance company" definition of § 2(a)(l7). 54 Stat. 793 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(l7) (1958). See generally 71 HARV. L. REv. 562, 563 (1958); 8 KAN. L. REv. 492, 495 
(1960). 
20 See note 2 supra. 
21 See Mearns, supra note 9, at 847; cf. 71 HARv. L. REv. 562 (1958). 
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ship which V ALIC had held was an investment transaction. Prohibited 
by the section 3(c)(3) from classifying Prudential as an "investment com-
pany," the Commission reasoned that the variable annuity segment of 
Prudential's business was a separate entity-an investment company created 
by Prudential and subject to federal securities regulation as such. The SEC 
apparently created this fictional "entity" only to define the scope of federal 
regulation;22 it indicated that enactment by the states of legislation to 
accommodate insurance regulation affecting variable annuities with the 
federal requirements would be appropriate.28 In practice, there is hardly 
any separation between the insurance company and the investment fund 
since the "pay-in" or investment period, as well as the annuity period, 
must be managed in harmony with the actuarial function.24 So too, the 
interdependence of the investment fund and general surplus, as planned 
by Prudential, would provide the annuitant some protection from mal-
feasance in the management of the investment fund as well as erroneous 
computation in the actuarial department.25 Thus, not only does a literal 
reading of the Investment Company Act permit classification of Prudential, 
including its business in variable annuities, as an "insurance company," 
but, also unlike VALIC, the existence of a business devoted primarily to 
insurance provides investment protections which were noticeably lacking 
in a company such as Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. Indeed, the absence 
of these protections explained why sale of variable annuities by Variable 
was prohibited in most states,26 and further indicates why federal regula-
tion was necessarily imposed by the Supreme Court. 
22 The Commission differentiated the investment fund from the insurance company 
on the basis of the promises: "[I]nsurance promises are made solely by the insurance 
company and supported by its assets (not including the investment fund); investment 
participations are measured solely by the investment fund (separate from the insurance 
company's assets)." Principal case at 7. The difficulty in this separation is that under 
Prudential's plan any dividend surpluses (excess over amounts estimated to be needed 
for administrative expenses of the variable annuity operation) are available for other 
operations of the insurance company; also, any deficiencies in the variable annuity 
operation resulting from lower mortality than assumed will be covered by the insurance 
company's general surplus. This "pourover" of profits and losses does not appear similar, 
even in its "entity" form, to an investment company. See principal case at 3-4. 
28 In response to Prudential's contention that Investment Company Act regulation 
would make it impossible for an insurance company to issue variable annuities, the 
Commission stated: "[I]t seems highly unlikely that any state, including New Jersey, 
would be reluctant to join with the largest insurance company in its jurisdiction to 
provide for a legitimate expansion of its business by amending its insurance code." 
Principal case at 7. 
24 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 372. 
25 See note 22 supra. 
26 Almost all states have quantitative and qualitative standards for the investments 
which can be made by insurance companies in common stocks; see, e.g., Mnm. STAT. 
ANN. § 61.ll(5) (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 5O6.l(g)(2) (1954). See also VALIC, 
359 U.S. 65, 94 (1959); PATTERSON, EssENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw 45-46 (2d ed. 1957). 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., being composed almost entirely of common stock invest-
ments, could operate only as a seller of securities. Note, however, that Prudential could 
sell the variable annuities within these state laws since its common stock proportion 
would not exceed the maximum allowed. Apart from the variable annuity issuers, there 
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Not only do the policy reasons underlying the V ALIC decision appear to 
be inapplicable to Prudential's circumstances, but the imposition of invest-
ment company regulation upon the issuer of the variable annuity effectively 
removes several of the "insurance" characteristics of this type of contract. Spe-
cifically, the redemption requirements of section 22( e) of the Investment Com-
pany Act and the public offering price standard of section 22(d) (exemptions 
from which were denied in Prudential's alternative application) preclude 
Prudential's proposals for a thirty-six month redemption period, which 
would discourage speculation,27 and prohibit a policy provision which 
would encourage timely payment of premiums by charging the defaulting 
annuitant a slight penalty. In return for this dilution of the variable an-
nuity as an insurance plan, federal regulation offers investor control of 
the investment fund "entity" through voting rights, a board of directors 
substantially independent from the insurance company, and more detailed 
information to the variable annuitant regarding the condition of the fund. 
The need for investor control and independence of directors would seem 
to be offset by a need, unique in the insurance industry, for coordination 
of the investment and actuarial functions. The protection intended by in-
dependence of directors could be achieved more expediently under the 
New Jersey laws which provide for appointment of six directors by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey.28 Under New Jersey law, the reliance of 
the variable annuity fund upon the actuarial skill, as well as the assets, 
of the insurance company would not be obstructed. It might also be ar-
gued that the typical annuitant, primarily interested in an adequate retire-
ment plan (as opposed to the more speculative interests of the investment 
company stockholder), would gain little advantage from the more elaborate 
federal disclosure provisions.29 It appears, then, that under federal regula-
tion the variable annuity is substantially changed from a retirement plan 
to what more closely resembles a medium for speculation. If the premise 
may be indulged that the V ALIC decision left a rational opening for con-
tinued exclusive state regulation of variable annuities when sold by a 
company "primarily engaged" in the insurance business, it appears that 
the regulation available under New Jersey law would afford a more reason-
able system of regulation than would the Investment Company Act. More-
over, the combined impact of federal securities regulation and state in-
appears to be a trend among insurance companies toward increased common stock 
trading. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 5, at 43 (3d ed. 1951). 
27 See Haussermann, supra note 6, at 386. See also Comment, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1115, 
1133 (1959), in regard to the N.A.I.C. proposal that speculation in variable annuities be 
prevented by prohibiting lump sum withdrawal of the cash value of the annuitant's 
"units." New Jersey law requires the thirty-six month payment period. N.J. REV. STAT. 
§ 17:35A-5(d) (Supp. 1963). 
28 See N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 17:34-3.12 to .22 (Supp. 1963). Other provisions enacted 
specifically to regulate the sale of variable annuities are codified in N.J. REv. STAT. 
§§ 17:35A-1 to -13 (Supp. 1963). 
29 See Comment, supra note 27, at 1128; but cf. Haussermann, supra note 6, at 390. 
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surance (and security) regulation may well discourage the sale by insurance 
companies of the potentially beneficial variable annuity. 
However, the apparent adequacy of New Jersey regulation of a com-
pany such as Prudential, and the burdening effects of concurrent state-federal 
regulation, do not dispose of the argument for the protections of the In-
vestment Company Act. Underlying the reasoning of both V ALIC and the 
principal case must have been the recognition of a need for a basic set of 
uniform requirements for variable annuity issuers throughout the nation-
a need which could only be answered by. the federal government. Regard-
less of what might be adequate supervision in New Jersey, other states, 
administering different insurance and securities laws, might fall far below 
the minimum protections provided by federal regulation. So too, the crea-
tion of new variable annuity companies, or assumption of the scheme by 
existing companies, could develop problems and dangers for the annuitant 
faster than state legislatures would be able to enact protective measures. 
The true balancing involved, then, was not between exclusive regulation 
under New Jersey laws and the added confusion under concurrent regula-
tion. Rather, it would appear that the Commission weighed the value of 
uniform, nationwide investor protection against the inherently inconsistent 
nature of state regulation, and found the former policy ultimately less 
confusing and more beneficial. The VALIC decision, as written, did not 
command such an extension as the principal case reached; however, both 
decisions seem to reflect a careful evaluation of state insurance regulation 
and a choice of concurrent state-federal regulation. Recalling the cata-
strophic beginnings of the unregulated investment company industry, the 
caution, despite the confusion, appears justified. 
In light of the holding in the principal case, it would appear that future 
sales by insurance companies of variable annuities will necessarily be con-
ducted through a subsidiary possessing a high degree of independence, as 
required by section 10 of the Investment Company Act.30 Another pos-
sibility. is that the insurance industry will drop the variable annuity entirely 
and leave its development to the "investment companies" such as Variable, 
whose prospectus was cleared by the SEC in 1960.31 A third possibility 
would be to modify the variable annuity contract to provide a certain 
minimum guaranteed return. A partial assumption of investment risk 
by the insurer should bring the variable annuity back into the insurance 
category.32 
William C. Brashares 
80 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1958). 
81 See Variable Life Ins. Co. of America, Investment Company Act Release No. 2975, 
Sept. 6, 1960. In contrast to Prudential, which was required to be registered under the 
Investment Company Act only to the extent of the investment fund, Variable was com-
pletely brought under the act, then given exemptions for its life and disability insurance 
contracts. See 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 501 (2d ed. 1961). 
82 See VALIC, 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959). 
